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Book Reviews
Intelligence and Espionage
Why Spy? The Art of Intelligence
By Brian Stewart and Samantha Newbery
Reviewed by Adrian Wolfberg, PhD, Chair of Defense Intelligence, School of
Strategic Landpower, US Army War College

S

tewart’s book, Why Spy?, is written for the British public and its
intelligence practitioners and scholars. Few British intelligence practitioners have shared their experiences, and Stewart’s book adds richness
to the limited genre.
Americans, on the other hand, are familiar with the litany of articles
and books about national security intelligence; American practitioners
have authored many of these, its scholars too. The American public had
its eyes opened to intelligence in the aftermath of Watergate and the
Church and Pike Committees of the 1970s. Even Kent and Kendall,
practitioners of intelligence, talked openly about the intelligence domain
in 1949, and from then to the present, American practitioners and scholars have had a continued conversation about it.
The relative openness about intelligence that Americans take for
granted is only a fairly recent phenomenon in the United Kingdom.
It was not until the end of the twentieth century that the existence of
MI5 (the Security Service focused on foreign threats inside the United
Kingdom), MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service focused on foreign threats
outside the United Kingdom), and the Government Communication
Headquarters (GCHQ), the equivalent of America’s National Security
Agency, were acknowledged by British officials.
American intelligence practitioners and scholars should appreciate
this contextual divide between the relative well-established public treatment of intelligence in the United States and the relative new treatment
in the United Kingdom in order to find new and interesting value in Why
Spy? American consumers of intelligence—civilian and military decision makers—will find this very readable book of considerable value.
Stewart was an intelligence analyst in Britain’s MI6, who rose to
chair the United Kingdom’s Joint Intelligence Committee from 19681972, and who retired in 1978. Stewart, who died in 2015, was the
primary author of Why Spy? written just prior to his death at the age of
93. He spent 50 years working in the intelligence field.
Stewart presents two key areas, not typically addressed by American
authors, but of potential interest to all audiences. First, using his personal experiences serving in Malaya in the late 1940s and early 1950s,
in Vietnam in the 1960s, and in China on and off from the 1940s to the
1980s, he convincingly argues that living in the country for which one
is responsible produces much better quality analysis than without such
experience. He identifies the lack of truly understanding the nuances
and complexities of a culture as a central problem of Western intelligence agencies.
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Second, Stewart calls attention to the distinction between intelligence
and covert action. He carefully defines intelligence as “…the business
of collecting information, analyzing it, assessing it, and presenting it to
those known as customers to assist their policymaking and decisions,”
an activity not purely practiced within the domain of government but
in business as well. He juxtaposes intelligence with covert actions as
activities “not concerned with intelligence gathering or assessment…
but to affect events.” Stewart raises the question of whether intelligence
agencies should carry out covert action, or whether other parts of government, like the military, should. He does not advocate the military,
rather, he observes it is an easy target to pin this policy-effecting activity
on, and that democracies should open the debate of who should own
covert action capability. Implicitly, Stewart is asking whether covert
action is intelligence, or something else. He comes down on the side of
the latter.
Stewart’s insider view of the United Kingdom’s foreign intelligence
service highlights four topics that will be of interest to a British audience.
These topics, well documented in American literature on intelligence,
are not especially new or insightful. However, Stewart discusses these
topics in a very accessible and personalized way that will be of interest to
the combat arms military professional. First, he outlines the relationship
between analyst and customer—the policymaker and the operational
military commander—and their responsibilities: the analyst to ensure
the customer takes notice of what is presented, and the customer for
not ignoring or rejecting inconvenient information. Second, he identifies
common cognitive limitations of analysts, including mirror imaging,
groupthink, over-reliance on the importance of numbers, wishful
thinking, and thinking the adversary is better equipped and prepared.
Third, Stewart talks about the moral aspects of intelligence, primarily
with regard to torture and interrogation. Fourth, he reviews intelligence
failures surrounding Pearl Harbor in the 1940s, Cuba in the 1960s, and
Iraq in the early 2000s. These reviews were not based on Stewart’s personal experiences and were not particularly well documented in terms
of references.
Why Spy? is a great introduction to the intelligence field, especially
for American consumers of intelligence: the policymaker and the military decision maker.

The Future of Foreign Intelligence: Privacy and Surveillance
in a Digital Age
By Laura K. Donohue
Reviewed by Richard H. Immerman, Francis W. DeSerio Chair in Strategic
Intelligence, US Army War College, and Edward J. Buthusiem Distinguished
Faculty Fellow in History, Temple University
New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2016
224 pages
$24.95

A

synthesis of history, constitutional law, and political theory, The
Future of Foreign Intelligence powerfully explores the tension between
security and civil liberties that has pervaded America since the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This tension has waxed
and waned throughout the course of US history. We think of the Alien
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and Sedition Acts; Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus;
the Palmer Raids; the internment of Japanese-Americans; McCarthyism;
and the catalysts for the Church Committee Hearings; enactment of
the Hughes-Ryan and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Acts; and establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. That list is far from
complete. But it is sufficient to suggest although America’s pendulum
historically swung back and forth, US citizens could count on the restoration of a proper balance.
In this slim book, Laura K. Donohue explains why she fears restoring this balance may no longer be possible, and why American’s civil
liberties will be the loser. The new technologies so central to contemporary life have served as game changers in terms of defining a “search”
and a “reasonable expectation of privacy” and of distinguishing between
what is foreign and what is domestic. Frequently, but not always, following the recommendations of the intelligence agencies, the White House,
Congress, and the courts have progressively institutionalized the erosion
of the Fourth Amendment. Donohue, a professor of law at Georgetown
University whom the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) appointed to serve as an amicus curiae, does not evaluate what
damage Edward Snowden’s revelations about National Security Agency
(NSA) programs may have caused America’s security. But she does highlight the evidence they provide about the damage these and attendant
programs have done to the core values of America’s Constitution. She
recommends some reforms, but they do not seem sufficient.
Though short and lightly footnoted, this book is not easy to read.
Donohue writes coherently and fluidly, but the nature of her subject
requires employing legalese to drill down deeply into case law. Still, she
succeeds in making intelligible the evolution of the legal framework put
in place since the 1970s to guide the collection of intelligence, especially
foreign intelligence. Donohue pays particular attention to the protections
afforded US citizens, and it is in this area the definitions of “search” and
a “reasonable expectation of privacy” emerge as so salient. She argues
persuasively the legislation and executive orders implemented during
the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan manifested
bipartisan agreement on the “need to provide heightened protections
for US citizens.” (11) Even after the Oklahoma bombings and rise of
al-Qaeda in the 1990s, these protections remained largely intact. Then
came 9/11. Arguing that in an instant everything changed, Donohue is
again persuasive. The Intelligence Community proposed Congress and
the Bush administration roll back the pre-existing protections, and the
new technologies provided instruments to achieve that end.
Donohue also makes explicit her judgment these changes have not
been for the better. Put bluntly, she assesses the post-9/11 surveillance
programs as legally problematic and unwarranted. She implies, and
here the reader would have benefited from deeper analysis and fuller
development, the legal framework created in the 1970s, and amended
in the 1980s and 1990s, could have adequately provided security for
Americans citizens without violating their constitutional rights and
American values. But the tragedy of 9/11 generated a political culture
that allowed the government to act precipitously, surreptitiously, and,
from Donohue’s point of view, recklessly. Beginning with STELLAR
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WIND, the NSA program launched before the end of 2001, Donohue
uses the Patriot Act, the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, the FISC’s authorization of PRISM and upstream collection, and parallel initiatives to
construct her case. These legal, constitutional, and technological details
are often overwhelming. She introduces the reader to “pen registers” and
“trap-and-trace devices,” and she devotes entire chapters to “metadata,”
and “content.” She also interrupts the narrative to present a history of
the Fourth Amendment and the prohibition against general warrants
that dates back to England’s Magna Carta in the 13th century. The arc
of her story, nevertheless, is unmistakable: A founding precept of the
United States was the“positive right to secure in one’s person, home,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure.” (84-85)
This positive right was inviolate—until 9/11.
The America Donohue portrays is an America far different than
what the Founding Fathers imagined. She implores Americans to ask
themselves if this is the America they want.
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Humans and War
Cold War Anthropology: The CIA, the Pentagon,
and the Growth of Dual Use Anthropology
By David H. Price
Reviewed by Janeen Klinger, Department of National Security and Strategy, US
Army War College

D

avid Price provides the reader with a descriptive narrative of the
relationship that grew between the US government and anthropologists during the Cold War, and that was anchored to funding provided for
anthropological research by various government agencies. Price’s concern
is this relationship distorted anthropology to the extent its practitioners
became thralls of the US military and the CIA. Indeed, Price spends
three chapters describing the controversy and divisive impact such ties
had on the internal workings of anthropology’s flagship organization, the
American Anthropology Association. Therefore, this book may be of
greater interest to anthropologists wishing to learn about the evolution
of their discipline. Other readers might find much of the narrative to be
a tedious laundry list of who produced work for which US agency.
Price recognizes that ties with the government between anthropologists and other social scientists emerged during World War II in
such organizations as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the
Office of War Information (OWI). Continuing these ties after the war
was a logical extension of this earlier work. However necessary the
wartime collaborations may have been, Price questions the ethics of
these collaborations for what he sees as the less noble post-war objective
of maintaining the American empire. On this point, anthropologists
may well be more sensitive concerning the ethics of ties to the government than other social scientists because some anthropological work in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was used by the colonial
powers to maintain their imperial control. Moreover, the discipline was
shaken by charges made by noted anthropologist Franz Boas in 1919
that four anthropologists had “prostituted” their science by using it as a
cover for spying in World War I. American policy.” Yet that game plan
is contained in NSC-68 as written by Paul Nitze, whose ideas varied
from those of Kennan. Inaccurately stating the context of Cold War
strategy in this way is especially damaging for Price because he criticizes
anthropologists who fail to include recognition of the broader political
context in their works.
Given the themes of this book, it can be located as part of that
literature from the political left critical of American Cold War foreign
policy. As such, the book suffers from two of that literature’s flaws.
First, like other critical examinations of American Cold War foreign
policy—especially those dealing with developing countries—the author
is surprised, and perhaps even offended, the United States pursued
goals of national interest rather than humanitarian ones. This tendency
is repeated throughout contemporary evaluations of Cold War modernization theory where scholars seem equally surprised the purpose the
theory served was not humanitarian but strategic. Such views do not

Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2016
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take into account the fact that at the heart of a realist foreign policy
that pursues strategic national interest lies a profoundly ethical concern.
Hans Morgenthau, the father of the American realist school, illustrated
this ethical concern when he asserted national survival is itself a moral
principle with prudence as the supreme virtue in international politics.
He went on to admonish those seeking moral crusades in foreign policy:
The lighthearted equations between a particular nationalism and the councils of Providence is morally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride
against which the Greek tragedians and the Biblical prophets have warned
rulers and ruled. That equation is also politically pernicious, for it is liable
to engender the distortion in judgment which in the blindness of crusading
frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations, in the name of moral principle,
ideal or God himself.1

A second flaw in this book relates to factual oversights and simplifications concerning Cold War American policy. One factual oversight
is the misstatement concerning the relationship between Project Troy
and the creation of MIT’s Center for International Studies (CENIS).
Project Troy led to the establishment of CENIS, not the reverse as the
author suggests. The author’s simplification relates to his view that it was
George Kennan’s “Cold War game plan that aggressively guided
Perhaps it is appropriate to observe in this era of intense polarization
in American politics that both the right and the left are guilty of tarnishing the American government. From the right, we hear the Reaganesque
view that the most frightening words in the English language are “I’m
from the government and I’m here to help” that suggests a certain illegitimacy of domestic government activity. From the left—as this book
illustrates—we come away with the idea that pursuit of the national
interest is an illegitimate basis for foreign policy. Both views contribute
to the impoverishment of the very notion of governance and political
responsibility.

Afterwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers
By Nancy Sherman
Reviewed by COL C. Anthony Pfaff, Policy Planning Staff, Office of the
Secretary, US Department of State

N
New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2015
256 pages
$24.95

ancy Sherman’s book Afterwar makes an important contribution to
what it means for a nation to go to war in the twenty-first century. It
emphasizes soldiers’ struggles to reintegrate into society after returning
from war and provides clear messages to multiple audiences in the critical
areas of individual and collective responsibility, civil-military relations,
and leadership. The book also has important lessons for individual soldiers, the public they serve, and the commanders and supervisors who
have the best opportunity—and the greatest responsibility—to ensure
the moral wounds associated with warfare are given the opportunity to
heal.
Sherman builds on her previous works concerning how the “traditional” stoic ethos the military instills in its personnel prepares them well
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th Edition Revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1978), 11.
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for fighting in war, but at the expense of living well in peace. Stoicism’s
detachment from personal desire and its emphasis on responsibility has
bred combatants who willfully accept extreme hardship and who are
prepared to hold themselves accountable for events that may be beyond
their control. While great for warfighting, these traits can interfere with
their ability to handle the moral wounds with which they return.
Sherman describes a marine sergeant who was racked with guilt over
the loss of two other marines in Afghanistan and, as a result, developed
symptoms associated with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). In
both cases, the sergeant pointed to an act he could have performed but
did not think of at the time. Here Sherman makes an important contribution to understanding moral injury in war. Generally speaking, moral
injury occurs in the presence of grievous moral transgressions, whether
committed by oneself or others, that “overwhelm one’s sense of goodness and humanity.” However, the striking thing about war is moral
injury can occur even when the transgression is relatively trivial or, as
in other cases Sherman describes, when one has done nothing wrong.
This point suggests military leaders need to rethink what “command
responsibility” means so soldiers can fight effectively without causing
needless harm to themselves or those they lead.
Such injuries, Sherman argues, can also be exacerbated by soldiers’
sense of justice for the cause for which they fight. Psychologically, it is
easier to bear loss when tangible good results. In this regard, Sherman
has a message for the public these soldiers nominally defend. In her
excellent chapter, “Don’t Just Tell Me Thank You,” she discusses the
gap in civil-military relations that has inexplicably widened even after
more than a decade of war. Noting that less than one percent of the
US population serves, Sherman aptly describes how well-intentioned
expressions of gratitude by many of the 99 percent who do not serve
creates resentment. This resentment arises because civilians are largely
distanced from the cost of war and, as a result, the ubiquitous “thank
you for your service” can seem too cheap to count as sharing any part
of the burden. This distance further contributes to confusion among
soldiers and civilians alike about why exactly we are at war. If civilians
are not invested in the cause, we have only our leaders’ words that it is
both just and worthwhile. In today’s cynical society, that word is often
not enough.
Sherman’s point is not that civilians should not express gratitude.
As members of the public, they share enough responsibility for the war
that they owe those who fight more than “thank you,” if their sentiment is to be judged genuine. While Sherman offers a number of ways
civilians can constructively bear this burden, she boils it down to this:
“assurance from civilian and military leaders and, collectively, from a
nation, that they (soldiers) are never just forces, never just an asset to
be used (or preserved) instrumentally as a part of military necessity
in achieving missions (and continuing the fight).” Civilians should be
invested enough in the war effort to make their voices heard by electing
leaders who will fight the right wars in the right ways, and who are held
accountable when they do not.
Sherman also relates stories of women in combat zones who raised
concerns to their commanding officers regarding sexual harassment.
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Sherman’s point is leaders should be especially sensitive where issues
closely associated with identity—like sexuality—are involved.
The most important contribution of Afterwar is the lesson that the
effective transition of soldiers back to society has to begin before the
war starts. We need to pay attention to what we teach soldiers about
responsibility, civilians about their duties, and leaders about how to
build trust and hope in their subordinates to ensure they will be resilient
in the face of adversity. While moral injury may be as unavoidable in
war as physical injury, we have much to do before we fully realize our
responsibilities to address it.
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Technology and War
Technology Security and National Power: Winners and Losers
By Stephen D. Bryen
Reviewed by Juliana Geran Pilon, Senior Fellow at the Alexander Hamilton
Institute for the Study of Western Civilization

L

ost in the cacophony of twitter-friendly bluster that passes for a
pre-electoral conversation on national security is the cold reality of
an America unprepared for technological attacks—whether by cyber,
chemical and biological, or a slew of nuclear devices. This is not news;
however the vast majority of Americans do not fully appreciate how the
current threats fit into a larger context, what means are at our disposal to
address them, and how the nation’s much-vaunted uberpower status is not
quite all it is cracked up to be. In no small measure, this unpreparedness
is because we have managed to squander our enormous advantages by
naively, myopically, or incompetently, failing to protect them.
For this problem and more, there is now a fascinating new book,
Technolog y Security and National Power, by leading technology security
expert Stephen D. Bryen. A former political science professor, his vast
experience ranges from leading the Pentagon’s technology policy efforts
during the Reagan years, serving on the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and vastly increasing the assets of a large aerospace and
defense and high-technology company when he served as president of
its North American branch.
Yet this is no “techy” tome; Bryen’s clear and lucid prose renders
even highly technical material accessible to the general reader. The narrative begins with the Bible and underscores the critical, if not decisive,
effect of technological superiority in determining “winners vs. losers,”
with particular emphasis on the recent past—and the American experience in particular.
History, unsurprisingly, turns out to have been far more contingent than it appears in hindsight, and in ways that are still, stubbornly,
relevant. For example, though most people know Germany’s atomic
program had been very advanced in the 1940s, often neglected are Japan’s
efforts, which consisted of two programs—one of which belonged to
the Japanese army and was based on Japan’s mainland, while the other
was run by Japan’s navy in what is now…North Korea. Bryen concludes
that “Russia’s hurried late entry in the war against Japan and occupation
of part of Korea, should be seen for what it most likely was: an effort to
stop Japan from getting a bomb.” The rest is not just history; it is now.
The story of chemical and biological weapons is of particular
interest, considering how easy they are to obtain and to use, and how
many companies (Bryen estimates, “countless”) worldwide are willing
to sell precursor materials and specialized manufacturing equipment
to facilitate the production of such weapons. Though all but useless
against modern armies equipped with protective gear and antidotes
against nerve gases and anthrax, their deployment against civilians is

Piscataway, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2015
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worrisome enough as instruments of terror, with great potential
for blackmail and just plain mindless destruction.
Added to the continued danger from al-Qaeda, whose demise has
been greatly exaggerated, are ongoing threats, notably from unstable
Pakistan—which may have already acquired tactical nuclear weapons
in addition to the uranium bomb—and Iran, which may decide to start
supplying its surrogates, Hamas and Hezbollah, with chemical and biological weapons currently at its disposal. Argues Bryen: “Anyone today
who believes that Iran is following only one path to make a bomb would
be naive. No country exposed to Iran’s growing nuclear capability can
afford to bet that Iran will abide by restrictions imposed by outsiders.”
Naivety is a luxury that few outside the United States can afford.
But of all threats, perhaps the most likely—and most dangerous—in
the near future is cyberwar. Though everyone knows the United States
no longer has any control over the proliferation of electronic technology,
the fact that even the Pentagon has turned to commercial off-the-shelf
technology means it faces a huge set of vulnerabilities. Bryen points to
an obvious, though under-reported, fallout from the infamous leaks by
Edward Snowden: they undermined confidence in all security products
from the United States. “Today American encryption products are under
suspicion both at home and especially abroad.”
While the topics with contemporary relevance are more urgent,
Technolog y Security and National Power is especially enjoyable for its richly
detailed historical case studies which give it the flair of a detective story.
For though we mostly know the ending, who won and who lost, the
closeness of the outcome in too many cases should serve as a warning
that happy endings are mostly made in Hollywood. Hoping to outsmart
our enemies is proving increasingly difficult. This book will go a long
way toward remedying that problem.

A Theory of the Drone
By Grégoire Chamayou; translated by Janet Lloyd
Reviewed by LTC Philip W. Reynolds, PhD Candidate, University of
Hawaii-Manoa

New York, NY: The New
Press, 2015
304 pages
$26.95

G

régoire Chamayou’s A Theory of the Drone delves into the ethical
and moral effects raised by the United States’ position as a
dominant state, its hyperbolic capabilities, the use of drones,
and the increasing commonality of signature strikes. The technology has
become basic: drones were hypothesized as far back as the 1930s with
their usefulness quickly converted to the battlefield. The theory of armed
drones has hybridized police and army functions into what Chamayou
calls a “conceptual monstrosity” (33). Their use is predicated on the legal
justification of the needs of armed conflict, and the laws of war, in
their ancient sense, were the codification of morality. Change the definitional underpinnings of armed conflict and one frees oneself from legal
restriction. Chamayou (57) explains this causal juxtaposition, by which
the threats that need pre-empting are everywhere, in turn requiring a new
understanding of the geography of killing in which the combatant on the
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battlefield has been flipped so that the battlefield is the combatant. This
new foundational premise fundamentally changes war.
Clausewitz described war as a duel between protagonists when
explaining his principles of battle. Instead of armies and battlefronts, to
Chamayou drone warfare is a manhunt. Instead of combatants confronting each other, one is the hunter, and the other is the prey who flees and
hides. This transitions war from what we knew to a war of the hunt. The
changing relationship between what the state offers and what the citizen
demands requires a change in the imposition of security. Anti-terrorism
has as its tactic the elimination of the emerging threats. Chamayou’s
calculus is killing breeds more terrorists, an assumption buttressed by
a program and its statistics of success which are misleadingly simple.
The positive reinforcement of the tactics of pre-emption leads to more
killing in an amaranthine loop. Military professionals are familiar with
the ne plus ultra of irregular war where the hunter must kill to win, while
the hunted simply has to avoid death to win. War has become hunting
and combat has become assassination.
The seduction of the drone has been the promised inevitable invulnerability. In its current form, airpower is the new mythical hero, the
latest in a line stretching back to Achilles, Ajax, Isfenidiyar and Baldur.
Like the giants of old, the technoligization of warfare reveals the built-in
weakness that invulnerability has—the valuation of human life, specifically Americans. Previously expected to close with and destroy the
enemy, drones are the answer to America’s allergic reaction to the fate
of combat (77). As the ability to preempt casualties has increased to
the point of pondering riskless wars, the death threshold—that level at
which America is willing to sustain deaths for a cause—has dropped
precipitously. Only 18 dead in Mogadishu was enough to force a retreat.
The subsequent death tolls in Iraq and Afghanistan—some 4,495 and
2,380 respectively—has seen a correlative increase in drone strikes. The
Obama administration’s campaign promises of ending those wars saw
an increase of some 700 percent, expanding from Pakistan to Somalia
and Yemen.1
Political expediency will continue to drive the automation of drone
warfare. In an effort to avoid the odium of war and potential charges
of public responsibility, increasingly complex algorithms will match
behavior to predetermined guilt. The desire to kill from a distance is not
new, indeed it is the goal of all commanders. Chamayou dismisses this
important facet of the discussion of drone wars in his goal to maximize
his argument and minimize those to whom a drone is, literally, the difference between life and death. Technological supremacy gives giant
advantage to one side or the other, with spectacular results: General Lord
Kitchener’s machine guns mowing down 10,000 Mahdi at Omdurman
at only the cost of 50 British. The implication is there is a disguised
element of racism in the use of untouchable technologically advanced
weapons against tribes not far removed from witchcraft and magic.

1     Scott Shane, “Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable Truth: US is Often Unsure About Who
Will Die,” New York Times, April 23, 2015.
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Chamayou’s most important contribution to the philosophy of
war is life at both ends of killing demands a pause, an acceptance that
combat is a most unfortunate option and to reject the idea of riskless
war. The lesson of A Theory of the Drone is that it is not recherché to kill the
defenseless, even one intent on murder.
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Regional Threats
The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its
Consequences
By Barak Mendelsohn
Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, PhD, Research Professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

B

arak Mendelsohn has written a comprehensive and well-considered
study of why al-Qaeda chose to associate itself with a number of
largely autonomous, often uncontrollable, and geographically distant terrorist organizations under a “branching out” strategy widely known as
“franchising.” Mendelsohn examines a number of important questions
about al-Qaeda’s franchising effort, including a consideration of how
well it has succeeded in advancing al-Qaeda’s interests. Throughout much
of the work, he considers the potential gains and even higher risks of a
franchising strategy, which have led al-Qaeda to accept various terrorist
organizations as autonomous parts of their organization. He further asks
why some franchises are more effective and loyal to the core organization
than others and under what circumstances does franchising appear to be
an attractive strategy.
Mendelsohn explains al-Qaeda did not begin its franchising strategy
until 2003 rather than when the organization was at the height of its power
and prestige immediately after the 9/11 strikes. He argues the franchising
effort was al-Qaeda’s response to its rapidly declining fortunes following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan but prior to what he identifies
as a jihadist renewal following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Mendelsohn
further maintains al-Qaeda’s inflated views of its own importance after
9/11 required it to prove its ability to continue the struggle in the face
of aggressive counter-terrorism measures. Unfortunately for bin Laden,
al-Qaeda lacked sufficient capabilities to send its own members to establish multiple branches in new geographical arenas by 2003. Franchising
existing terrorist organizations became the easy, cheap, but also risky
response to this problem.
The al-Qaeda strategy of franchising has been organized as a twotier structure with a central command (often called “al-Qaeda central”
by both organization leaders and the media) and various subordinate
branches, each of which is responsible for a particular geographical
region. The central organization is formally responsible for high-level
strategy and direction, while the franchises conduct daily operations
often including local target selection, propaganda, recruitment, and
coordination with potentially friendly organizations and individuals.
Establishing franchises with local terrorist organizations also lowered
al-Qaeda’s start-up costs by providing a pre-existing infrastructure and
presenting the possibility of an immediate operational impact with
local resources. An existing terrorist infrastructure usually includes
operatives, support personnel, media, and logistical assets such as safe
houses and access to weapons and money. Conversely, a central problem
with franchises is that they are often extremely difficult to control.
Franchises often provide late and incomplete information to their parent

New York, NY: Oxford
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organization, making it more difficult for the leadership to employ the
group effectively as part of a larger strategy. Whether or not the franchise follows the parent group’s instructions to any serious extent often
depends on the affiliate’s reservoir of good will and if the group depends
on the parent organization financially.
There have also been different kinds of al-Qaeda franchises. In Iraq,
Algeria, and Somalia, that organization merged with existing radical
groups by mutual agreement. In Yemen and Saudi Arabia, they used
their own members to establish and organize the franchise. Under these
circumstances, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating
first out of Saudi Arabia and then Yemen, became al-Qaeda’s most
loyal supporter. Unsurprisingly, other affiliates without a history of
cooperation have showed much less loyalty and sometimes embarrassed
al-Qaeda by their undisciplined and counterproductive actions. In the
case of Somalia, for example, the merger with the local terrorist group
al-Shabab became a major problem. In this instance, al-Qaeda partnered
with a self-destructive group, with an authoritarian and paranoid leader,
Ahmed Abdi Godane, who weakened his organization through internal
purges and even killed foreign volunteers. In this environment, some
al-Shabab members chose to surrender to the government rather than
die at the hands of Godane’s executioners. Elsewhere, Algeria’s Salafist
Group for Preaching and Combat (French abbreviation: GSPC), became
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) after long and detailed negotiations with bin Laden. This group appeared to have a great deal of
potential, but it never played out in the way the al-Qaeda leadership had
expected. Instead, AQIM basically operated as a criminal and smuggling
group and showed no capacity to strike at Europe as bin Laden had
hoped. Still, once foreign terrorist groups had become part of al-Qaeda,
bin Laden and his deputy and eventual successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
remained reluctant to renounce undisciplined affiliates. Some members
of al-Qaeda central advocated that their organization sever ties with
rogue branches, but bin Laden believed these actions would have
required an unacceptable level of public disclosure about severe internal
differences within al-Qaeda.
Despite significant difficulties in Somalia and Algeria, the most
serious franchise problems for al-Qaeda clearly came from Iraq where
bin Laden sought and obtained an affiliation with Tawhid wal-Jihad
(TWJ), led by the deeply problematic and untrustworthy Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi. TWJ, which had been operating in Iraq since before the war,
agreed to affiliate with al-Qaeda and became al-Qaeda in the Land of
Two Rivers (often shortened to al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI). The merger
allowed al-Qaeda to maintain that it was fighting in the central battle
against US forces in the Middle East, but TWJ demanded as a condition
for union that they be allowed to continue prioritizing fighting against
Iraq’s Shi’a Muslims, whom Zarqawi hated. The al-Qaeda leadership
requested that Zarqawi place his war against the Shi’as on the backburner, but both he and his later successors were unwilling to do so.
Under pressure to show relevance, al-Qaeda accepted the union of the
two organizations on Zarqawi’s terms, and terrorism against Iraqi Shi’a
continued unabated. By late 2006 (shortly after Zarqawi’s death), AQI
merged with several smaller terrorist organizations to form the Islamic
State of Iraq (ISI), making these moves without bothering to consult the
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al-Qaeda leadership. ISI later expanded into Syria and changed its name
to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to reflect the organization’s
operations in both theaters. When Zawahiri (by then the head of alQaeda) ordered ISIS to focus its activities on Iraq and allow al-Qaeda’s
Syrian affiliate the Nusra Front to lead the jihadist efforts there he was
met with open ISIS defiance.
The ISIS rebellion against al-Qaeda’s authority after bin Laden’s
death exposed the new al-Qaeda leader’s inability to control its affiliates. While it was easier for ISIS to rebel against Zawahiri than bin
Laden, Mendelsohn maintains that the rebellion was probably inevitable
in any event. In ISIS, al-Qaeda faced a franchise that turned dramatically against them rather than simply an affiliate that tarnished the
organization’s reputation. In response to this hostility, on February
2, 2014, al-Qaeda issued a statement announcing that it had severed
its ties with ISIS and no longer considered the group to be one of its
branches. At this point, it was clear Zawahiri had been deftly outmaneuvered by a strong and power-hungry competitor which successfully
replaced al-Qaeda as the leading force in the global jihadist movement.
Not long after these events, a number of al-Qaeda members in a variety
of its franchises defected from the organization and pledged loyalty to
ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was eventually to rename his
organization the Islamic State.
In his conclusion, Mendelsohn maintains al-Qaeda’s franchising
effort was a failure driven by the need to maintain leadership of the jihadist movement rather than a serious cost/benefit analysis of the wisdom
of affiliating with various radical groups. Currently, al-Qaeda’s relevance
has been almost completely displaced by the Islamic State, which even
under heavy coalition bombing remains the most important organization within the jihadist movement. In contrast, Mendelsohn assesses
al-Qaeda to be weaker than any time since it claimed the leadership of
global jihadism. Perhaps its only franchise that continues to matter is
AQAP, which has gradually been replacing al-Qaeda central by assuming greater responsibility for the future of the organization. Mendelsohn
maintains there is almost no chance for al-Qaeda to recover its former
status while Zawahiri is at the helm, and it has few accomplishments
to show its constituency and financial supporters as the memory of
9/11 has faded. Under these circumstances, it is fully possible that the
Islamic State will replace al-Qaeda in its few remaining sanctuaries such
as Yemen and Pakistan, and that al-Qaeda will continue to recede into
insignificance.

Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America
Edited by Joseph M. Humire and Ilan Berman
Reviewed by Dr. José de Arimatéia da Cruz. Visiting Research Professor
at the US Army War College and Professor of International Relations and
Comparative Politics at Armstrong State University, Savannah, GA
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ran’s influence in Latin America and its national security implications
have finally caught the attention of US policy makers in Washington.
This greater interaction would go unnoticed were it not for the partnerships established between Iran and some of the Latin American countries.
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Ahmadinejad’s political goal was to establish a policy toward Latin America
that was anti-American. As he has publicly stated, “Tehran is pursuing a
strategy that promotes its own ideology and influence in Latin America
at Washington’s expense.” This foreign policy posture creates what the
late Hugo Chavez referred to as “the axis of unity” foreign policy against
the United States’ “imperialist” foreign policy. In one of Ahmadinejad’s
many trips to Latin America in 2009, Chavez referred to him as a “gladiator of anti-imperialist struggles.” In Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin
America, Joseph M. Humire and Ilan Berman call our attention to what
they consider to be the most complex security challenge in the Western
Hemisphere today, which is how deeply the Islamic Republic of Iran has
penetrated the internal affairs of Latin America and what it means from
a foreign policy perspective to the United States.
The book is divided into fourteen chapters, each addressing Iran’s
relations with a specific country in Latin America. Within the book the
authors focus on the organization known as the Bolivarian Alliance for
the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) founded by the late Hugo Chavez.
Humire and Berman argue Iran’s expansion into areas not traditionally
associated with its sphere of influence requires a global response since it
represents an imminent threat to the rest of the world. America should
play particular attention to Iran’s expanding influence since most of
Iran’s diplomatic meddling is taking place in the US’s backyard.
Iran’s Latin American partners are part of the so-called “pink tide”
that came to power between the years of 1998 and 2009. The “pink
tide” nations are united by their strong contempt of Washington’s policies and anti-American sentiment. Despite the fact that the “pink tide”
did not have a clear-cut ideology, they were united in opposition to the
Washington Consensus, a laundry list of demands imposed by the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its economic
policy toward the region. An alliance between the “pink tide” nations
of Latin American and Iran represents an alternative to the United
States and its intrusive foreign policy dictates. The book highlights
how Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Colombia have
become pawns in the Iranian chess game in its attempt to find an alternative to its economic and diplomatic isolation imposed by the United
States resulting from the passage of the Countering Iran in the Western
Hemisphere Act of 2012. Berman argues in the chapter “What Iran Wants
in the Americas,” Iran’s goal in Latin America is to build support in the
Americas for its diplomatic isolation as a rogue nation by establishing a
presence in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Iran is also expanding
its economic ties with the region by signing close to 500 cooperative
agreements. Latin America provides Iran with an alternative for its quest
for strategic resources. Again, Berman points out that, “since the mid2000s Iran has become a major speculator in Latin America’s resource
wealth.” (4) He also claims Iran’s Quds Force are deeply involved in
Latin America “stationing operatives in foreign embassies, charities, and
religious/cultural institutions to foster relationships with people, often
building on existing socio-economic ties with the well-established Shia
Diaspora.” (5)
Iran’s penetration of Latin America has also been facilitated by a
marriage of radical ideologies. This marriage involves the union of radical
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Islam with the radical left that has come to power with the rise of the
“pink tide.” ALBA, according to Joel Hirst, is a revolutionary organization which challenges the Western world’s rule of law and representative
democracy and seeks to replace it with a new authoritarian model of governance (21). Iran’s association with ALBA increases Iran’s diplomatic
allies in the region, allows for engagement in economic trade while
bypassing US economic sanctions, and allows Iran to further increase
its participation in criminal activity such as supporting Hezbollah’s
activities in the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay) and
recruiting, indoctrinating and proselytizing Latin American citizens
(27). The union of Iran with the ALBA axis represents “Washington’s
greatest challenge in the Hemisphere” (30). Secretary of State Kerry’s
Fall 2013 announcement that the “Era of Monroe Doctrine is Over” in
a speech before the Organization of American States caused some Latin
American leaders to believe the United States does not care about the
region. The perception is Latin America will once again be a traditional
“benign neglect” problem to be dealt with only when necessary.
Students at the US Army War College and future military leaders
will greatly benefit from reading Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America.
Whether we agree with the authors’ overall assessment of Iran’s role in
the region, one thing is for sure: Iran’s penetration of Latin America in
such a short period of time presents a serious challenge to US national
security interests in the Western Hemisphere. The US government and
its army can ignore Iran’s influence and meddling in the region or cautiously begin to assess what implications it will present in the future of
US-Latin American relations in the post-hegemonic American era of the
twenty-first century.
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t is often forgotten just how “German” the United States was when
the First World War broke out: the German-American community produced hundreds of German-language newspapers, the use of German
in Lutheran church services was widespread, and the “German vote”
mattered in many regional or state elections. Reaching out to this community to influence public opinion in the United States made perfect
sense for the German leadership, and it is to the great credit of Chad
Fulwider’s book that he explores these attempts in detail for the first time.
He begins with one of Britain’s first actions of the war—the cutting of
the submarine cables that denied Berlin the swift communications with
the other side of the Atlantic that London continued to enjoy. He then
examines the activities of official propaganda units such as the German
Information Office in New York as well as self-motivated activists and
academics. The story Fulwider narrates is dominated by misunderstandings: the first one was the idea that all German speakers in the
United States belonged to one coherent community that fully supported
Kaiser Wilhelm II and the German war effort. Yet, many had emigrated
before Germany had even been unified, and they saw Germany primarily
as a “Kulturnation,” a national community defined by language, culture
and religion. Wilhelmian militarism and aggressive imperialism had only
become pervasive in German society after most German-Americans had
left.
The second problem was that much of this propaganda was published in German. While some of the largest newspapers such as the
New Yorker Staatszeitung realized the need to publish English translations
of their leading articles, many continued to engage in what Fulwider
describes as “preaching to the choir.” But reaching out to mainstream
America was vital as Britain had successfully pioneered the use of
“atrocity propaganda” by defining the violation of Belgian neutrality
as the “Rape of Belgium,” with a strong focus on allegations of widespread sexual violence.1 Given that many of these allegations proved to
be wrong, German propaganda should have had a chance to counter
that narrative, but Fulwider argues there was a conscious decision not
to lower the tone and engage with what were perceived as yellow press
methods. Instead, German propaganda relied on a sober and factual tone
that to non-Germans seemed ponderous and boring. Moreover, articles
often highlighted the fact that they came straight from the Imperial government to exploit the traditional German deference to state authority.
Against the British propaganda machine in Wellington House, so adept

1     Nicoletta F. Gullace, “Sexual Violence and Family Honor: British Propaganda and
International Law during the First World War,” The American Historical Review 102, no. 3 (June 1997):
714-747.
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at focusing on catchy narratives and hiding the state-funded nature of its
message, this very German approach stood little chance.
These inadequacies have hidden the fact that the German case in
the early months of the war was better than is often assumed: the British
blockade had extremely shaky legal foundations and openly interfered
with US export interests not only to Germany, but also to neighboring countries such as the Netherlands. Woodrow Wilson worried that
Britain might provoke the spirit of 1812 and America’s identity as the
proud defender of neutral rights and the freedom of the seas, and some
of the best German propaganda efforts attempted to tap into this narrative while ridiculing pro-British voices as pining for the days of King
George III. So effective were some of the articles written by Harvard
psychologist Hugo Münsterberg that a London businessman offered a
$10 million donation if the professor was sacked—Harvard refused. Yet
Münsterberg and his fellow German professors in the United States,
such as Moritz Julius Bonn or Eugen Kühnemann, failed to prevent the
establishment of an alternative narrative that saw Britain and the United
States united in their respect for law and civilization and in their disgust
for German brutality. German propaganda never recovered from the
sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915, and Fulwider describes the increasingly desperate attempts by the US-based diplomats to explain to the
Berlin government just how offensive these sinkings were to the US
public. Therefore, the German propaganda effort lost battle after battle,
whether it was about the decision not to ban the export of arms and
munitions, the lifting of the ban on raising war loans in New York, or
the eventual decision allowing British customers to buy much-needed
supplies on credit. Taken together, these decisions had an enormous
impact on the allied war effort.
At this point, Fulwider’s book shifts focus and looks at the German
sabotage efforts on US and Canadian soil. Some of these were quite
ingenious, especially a clever attempt to corner the market for vital
specialist equipment and raw materials for munitions production by
secretly setting up a German-run munitions factory that never planned
to deliver on the large orders it took from Britain. Still, it is telling that
the German government ran the propaganda and sabotage programs
as one coordinated effort, despite the obvious problems for Germany’s
public image when the latter became public, as it inevitably did. Military
attaché Franz von Papen was expelled from the country, with charges
relating to arson at munitions factories only dropped after he became
German chancellor in 1932.
Once the German high command had decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare, German propaganda attempts on American
soil were doomed, and the book effectively ends in 1916. This is justifiable, but it is disappointing that the author has failed to consult any
books published after he was awarded his PhD in 2008. Many recent
works on US neutrality, German-Americans or indeed German First
World War propaganda have been missed, and that omission leaves the
task of putting Fulwider’s results into the context of recent research
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to the reader.2 They do fit in rather well though, confirming a global
pattern of well-funded, but improvised propaganda efforts marred by an
unwillingness to learn from, and adapt to, Britain’s innovations.
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Cold War Army
By Andrew B. Godefroy
Reviewed by Major H. Christian Breede, CD PhD, Assistant Professor of
Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada and Deputy Director of
the Centre for International Defence Policy, Queen’s University
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A

ppendices, those extra pages of graphs, charts, and tangential
explanatory material found at the end of academic works, are at
the best of times glanced at and more often ignored. Doing so in Andrew
Godefroy’s In Peace Prepared would be a shame. In particular, nestled before
an extensive set of notes and a comprehensive bibliography, this book’s
fourth appendix presents a chilling and compelling narrative the likes of
which Harry Turtledove would have approved. The passage recounts
what the employment of a battlefield nuclear weapon would have looked
like for the soldiers of a rifle company from the 11th Canadian Infantry
Brigade Group occupying a non-descript piece of ground somewhere in
central Europe in the late 1950s or early 1960s. The passage is horrifying
and illuminating.
Although a reproduction of an original piece that appeared in a 1959
Canadian Army training manual, the passage grippingly underlines a key
theme in Godefroy’s book, namely, that combat development (known
more conventionally today as force development or how we think about
how we fight) is indeed an important process. Put simply, force development during the 1950s—the dawn of the Cold War—had led the
militaries of the newly minted North Atlantic Treaty Organization to
conceive of operational plans that included the employment of nuclear
weapons at the tactical level. This plan was known as MC-48 and was
the blueprint for the defense of Europe until the 1960s.
That this plan persisted for as long as it did is as equally terrifying
as the naïve view that one could actually fight in such an irradiated
environment (to say nothing of the strategic error of seeing such nuclear
exchanges as limited to the field of battle in question). Only with the
introduction of the strategic concept of “flexible response” and the recognition of many senior political and military leaders who, as Godefroy
states, saw “tactical nuclear war as folly” and something that “should be
2     Ryan Floyd, Abandoning American Neutrality: Woodrow Wilson and the Beginning of the Great War,
August 1914-December 1915 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow
Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917 (Charlottesville, VA: University
Press of Virginia, 2007); Lars Maischak, German Merchants in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic (Cambridge,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Mischa Honeck, We Are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking
Immigrants and American Abolitionists after 1848 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2011);
David Welch, Germany and Propaganda in World War I: Pacifism, Mobilization and Total War (London:
I.B.Tauris, 2014); Troy R.E. Paddock (ed.), World War I and Propaganda (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Jürgen
von Ungern-Sternberg/Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg, Der Aufruf ‘An die Kulturwelt!’: Das Manifest
der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt a. M. 2013); Alexander
Will, Kein Griff nach der Weltmacht Geheime Dienste und Propaganda im deutsch-österreichisch-türkischen
Bündnis 1914-1918 (Cologne, 2012); andAnne Schmidt, Belehrung – Propaganda - Vertrauensarbeit: Zum
Wandel amtlicher Kommunikationspolitik in Deutschland 1914-1918 (Essen, 2006).
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avoided at all costs,” was the inevitable and unavoidable strategic nature
of nuclear weapons fully recognized. As a result, NATO began urging
member-states to modernize and expand their forces to meet the Soviet
threat conventionally. The process of force development played a large
part in bringing about this change and how this happened is one of the
major themes in In Peace Prepared.
Godefroy’s book, in tracing this Cold War history of force development in Canada (specifically Canada’s Army), provides a detailed and
unique contribution not just to the existing body of Cold War history
(as he ably points out in his first chapter), but also to the broader discussions of civil-military relations in Canada which no doubt will resonate
elsewhere, too. Indeed, his discussion on the tension between political
expediency and military necessity that seemed to hamper force development during the 1950s and 1960s is not unique to that period. His
story of the ill-fated Bobcat armored personnel carrier as well as his
discussion on the unification of the armed forces in Canada (the removal
of individual elemental identities and the formation of one Canadian
Forces) are two examples of a long history of this tension. Particularly
in the Canadian context, examinations of Canada’s decades-long efforts
to replace its aging maritime helicopters or the recent cancellation of the
close-combat vehicle are modern examples of this same tension at play.
What is interesting to note, and not mentioned in Godefroy’s book,
is that this tension is unavoidable as political and military interests—
especially in peacetime—will often diverge. This recognition, while
unpleasant, does help explain a key challenge to force development not
just in Canada’s military but in others as well. A rigorous, overt, and
replicable force development process—the history of which Godefroy
cleanly and clearly presents in his book—is still simply a tool with which
to make a recommendation for a decision. This decision is not made
by those in uniform, rather it is made by elected officials, and it is here
where the divergent interests lie. When the political and military interests align, the process is clear and worthwhile, however, when these
interests diverge, political interest will win the day and the military will
make do. Godefroy’s book shows this clearly with his discussion on the
creation of Mobile Command in the 1960s—effectively an organization
that needed to find a role for itself after it was created.
In Peace Prepared is a great read. It is clean and jargon-free and written
by that rare combination of a soldier (Godefroy is a serving officer in
Canada’s Army) and a scholar (he holds a doctorate in War Studies from
the Royal Military College of Canada). Although a clear contribution to
early Cold War history, this book is also a valuable insight into the civilmilitary relations of the time and reveals that although the context may
have changed, the challenges facing militaries as they think, prepare,
and fight perhaps has not.

